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At the center of the financial market crisis of 2007-2008 was a highly unusual jump in spreads between
the overnight inter-bank lending rate and term London inter-bank offer rates (Libor). Because many
private loans are linked to Libor rates, the sharp increase in these spreads raised the cost of borrowing
and interfered with monetary policy. The widening spreads became a major focus of the Federal Reserve,
which took several actions — including the introduction of a new term auction facility (TAF) — to
reduce them. This paper documents these developments and, using a no-arbitrage model of the term
structure, tests various explanations, including increased risk and greater liquidity demands, while
controlling for expectations of future interest rates.  We show that increased counterparty risk between
banks contributed to the rise in spreads and find no empirical evidence that the TAF has reduced spreads.
The results have implications for monetary policy and financial economics.
John B. Taylor
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  On Thursday, August 9, 2007 traders in New York, London, and other financial 
centers around the world suddenly faced a dramatic change in conditions in the money 
markets where they buy and sell short-term securities. The interest rate on overnight 
loans between banks—the effective federal funds rate—jumped to unusually high levels 
compared with the Fed’s target for the federal funds rate.  Rates on inter-bank term loans 
with maturities of a few weeks or more surged as well, even though no near-term change 
in the Fed’s target interest rate was expected.  Many traders, bankers, and central bankers 
found these developments surprising and puzzling after many years of comparative calm. 
  The turmoil did not disappear the next day. The overnight interest rate whipsawed 
sharply down on Friday as the New York Fed pumped liquidity into the market, with the 
rate overshooting the target on the down side by a large margin.  Even more worrisome 
was that term inter-bank rates, those for loans lasting a month to several months, moved 
up further on Friday despite the increase in liquidity provided by central banks.  Rates on 
term lending, such as the Libor one- and three-month rates, seemed to have become 
disconnected from the overnight rate and thereby from the Fed’s target for interest rates. 
It was as if banks suddenly demanded more liquidity or had grown reluctant to lend to 
each other, perhaps because of fears about the location of newly disclosed losses on sub-
prime mortgages. 
  As we now know, that Thursday and Friday of August 2007 turned out to be just 
the start of a remarkably unusual period of tumult in the money markets, perhaps even 
qualifying as one of those highly unusual “black swan” events that Taleb (2007) has 
recently written about (see Cecchetti 2008 for a full discussion of the events leading up to 
and including the crisis).  The episode raises important questions for monetary theory and   2
policy.  At a minimum, the sharp increases in spreads provide new data to stress test our 
theories of the term structure of interest rates.  Moreover, the money market represents 
the first stage of the monetary transmission channel, where monetary policy actions first 
come in contact with the rest of the financial system and the entire economy. Term 
money market rates, such as 3-month Libor, affect the rates on loans and securities from 
home mortgages to business loans. A poorly functioning money market impinges on the 
availability and cost of credit to businesses and households and jeopardizes the 
effectiveness of monetary policy.    
  The Federal Reserve made several attempts to improve conditions in money 
markets and thereby reduce the spread between term inter-bank lending rates and the 
overnight rate. Early on, it lowered the penalty on borrowing at the discount window 
bringing the discount rate below the prevailing Libor rate, and it strongly encouraged 
banks to borrow. But banks were reluctant to borrow from the discount window and there 
was little response. Then in December 2007—four months after the crisis began—the Fed 
introduced a major new lending facility, the Term Auction Facility (TAF), through which 
banks could borrow from the Fed without using the discount window.   
The purpose of this paper is to document these unusual developments in money 
markets, assess various theories underlying them, and evaluate the impact of policy 
actions like the Term Auction Facility.  In the original draft of this paper, written in 
February 2008, we put forth the hypothesis, based on a simple financial market model, 
that the Term Auction Facility would not reduce the spreads between Libor and the 
federal funds rate when correcting for term expectations, contrary to the purpose of the 
facility. We also provided statistical tests that could not reject this hypothesis. However,   3
because the spread narrowed from December 2007 through February 2008 after the TAF 
was introduced, central bank officials and others judged that the TAF was working. For 
example, Mishkin (2008), speaking in mid February of 2008 and noting the decline in the 
term spread, stated that “the TAF may have had significant beneficial effects on financial 
markets.”  Soon thereafter, however, the spread widened again, adding evidence to 
support the theoretical hypothesis put forth in this research.  The renewed stress in the 
markets also gave rise to a host of new Federal Reserve actions and lending facilities.
1  
  Though the financial turmoil persists, we view the introduction of these new 
facilities and actions as marking the beginning of a new phase of the crisis, where new 
policy responses will be evaluated and tested.  Accordingly, this study focuses on the first 
phase of the crisis, more specifically, the period from Thursday, August 9, 2007 through 
Thursday, March 20, 2008. Sufficient observations have accumulated during the 161 
trading days of this first phase to draw several conclusions that are of interest from a 
theoretical perspective and may be useful to policy makers going forward.    
 
1. The August 9 Break Point: Target, Effective, and Term Fed Funds 
  Figure 1 focuses on three money market interest rates which nicely illustrate the 
changes in market conditions in August 2007—(1) the target for the federal funds interest 
rate as set by the Federal Open Market Committee, (2) the daily effective overnight 
federal funds rate in the market, and (3) the interest rate on 3-month Libor. The Libor 
interest rate in the London inter-bank market in dollars is essentially the same as the 
                                                 
1 On Tuesday March 11 the new Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the expansion of the TAF 
from $60 billion to $100 billion was announced. On Friday March 14 a new loan package to Bear Stearns 
through JP Morgan was announced.  On Sunday March 16 a new Primary Dealers Credit Facility (PDCF) 
was announced.   4
interest rate on term fed funds for comparable maturities, so we focus on the former in 
this study.  (Nothing material would change if we focused on rate on term fed funds 
directly.)  
  First, observe in Figure 1 that the volatility of the effective federal funds rate (the 
average rate at which overnight fed funds actually transact) relative to the target 
increased after August 9.  During the period from the start of the year through August 8, 
2007, the standard deviation of the difference between the effective funds rate and the 
target was only 3 basis points. From August 9, 2007 to March 20, 2008 the standard 
deviation was 20 basis points. Note that the steadiness of the federal funds rate at 5.25 
percent may be one of the reasons for the relatively small misses in the earlier period, but 
if you include the years back to the beginning of 2002 the volatility is 6 basis points, still 
much less than the 20 basis points seen during the period that we study.  There have been 
other periods where the effective funds rate was more volatile, particularly before the Fed 
became more transparent about its interest rate setting.  Taylor (2001) presents a model 
that focuses on effective fed funds rate volatility.  
  Second, and this is the main focus of our paper, observe how the spread between 
3-month Libor and the Fed’s overnight federal funds rate target increased dramatically 
starting in August and fluctuated erratically after that. During the year before August 9, 
2007, the 3-month Libor spread above the target federal funds averaged only 11 basis 
with a standard deviation of a mere 1 basis point—a period of very low volatility. Similar 
changes in spreads between term rates and overnight rates are apparent for other Libor 
maturities and for several other countries, as we document below.     
















Figure 1.  Key money market rates from September 2006 to March 2008 
2. Potential Explanations 
  Ever since the turmoil began, traders, bankers, economists, and others have 
offered explanations for the dramatic increase in the Libor spread. We think it is useful to 
categorize the many explanations into several types.  
  First, and perhaps the most commonly mentioned explanation is “counterparty 
risk,” which simply means banks became more reluctant to lend to other banks because 
of the perception that the risk of default on the loan had increased and/or the market price 
of taking on such risk had risen. Recall that inter-bank lending in the Libor market or 
term fed funds is unsecured.    6
  Of course, this explanation has the virtue of reflecting the widely-reported reality 
that many banks were writing down the values of securities that they owned.  These 
securities had either been downgraded in terms of quality or were backed by sub-prime 
mortgages that were becoming delinquent or going into foreclosure as housing prices 
stopped increasing and began to fall.  Clearly, the continuing decline in housing prices 
and the slowing economy could easily raise the chances of a further deterioration in the 
value of mortgage-related assets on the banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, the realization 
of the risks in derivative securities based on sub-prime mortgages triggered doubts about 
many other aspects of the derivative market, including the ability of credit default 
insurers to meet their obligations and the size and nature of the likely restructuring of the 
off-balance sheet operations known as structured investment vehicles (SIVs). 
  Another explanation, which might be called “liquidity risk,” is that traders at one 
bank are reluctant to expose the traders’ bank’s funds during a period of time where those 
funds might be needed to cover the bank’s own shortfalls.  Effectively, the trader may not 
be given as much “balance sheet” to invest, which is perceived as a shortage of liquidity 
to the trader.   While it is difficult to distinguish counterparty risk from liquidity risk, we 
note that the interest rate on CDs, which are also held by individuals and non-banks, 
follows Libor closely during this period.  Hence, it is not only banks that are getting 
premiums when lending to banks, indicating that once counterparty risk is taken into 
account there is little additional role for liquidity risk as defined here. 
  A third and closely related explanation was often heard during the period of 
November and January. Banks needed liquidity to make sure that their own balance   7
sheets looked respectable in end-of-year financial reports, especially given the stress and 
scrutiny that many banks had been under.   
  The fourth explanation relates to expectations of future interest rate changes.  
Expectations of declining overnight rates, for example, will cause term Libor rates to 
decline as well, all else equal. Except for the very beginning of the turmoil period, this 
explanation would tend to bring the spread between the Libor rate and the target fed 
funds rate lower because of expectations of future interest rate decline due to policy 
easing.  It is necessary to take account of this factor when assessing the other factors that 
could be moving the spread around. For example, if you look closely at Figure 1 you see 
that the spread between Libor and the fed funds target comes down before cuts in the 
federal funds rate. Indeed, toward the end of our sample in mid February, the spread 
narrowed significantly, but this could be due to expectations of future interest rate cuts. 
We therefore control for expectations of future interest rates in the analysis that follows.  
 
3. A Model 
  In order to distinguish between these various explanations we need a model of 
money market interest rates through which we can interpret the risk, liquidity, and 
expectations factors that we have argued are important. It is essential to take out pure 
expectations effects, which always create differences between longer term interest rates 
and overnight fed funds. Recall that Libor is a term rate (3 month in Figure 1) and fed 
funds are one-day maturity. 
  Early models of the money market used for monetary policy developed in 
the1970s and 1980s (see Anderson and Rasche, 1982, for a review) are not sufficient for   8
this purpose because they neither account for forward-looking expectations nor risk 
premia. More recent finance models used by Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and others are 
more useful for this purpose.  Moreover the earlier models used estimated demand 
functions for securities, an approach that is not possible to implement in the current 
situation, because available data is in the form of prices (in the form of interest rates), 
rather than quantities.    
Our model focuses on three interest rates as defined below:  
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The Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) rate is closely connected to the average overnight 
interest rate expected to prevail over the next n days.  An OIS is structured as follows: at 
maturity, the parties exchange the difference between the interest that would be accrued 
from repeatedly rolling over an investment in the overnight market and the interest that 
would be accrued at the agreed OIS fixed rate.  The TAF is described in detail below.   
  Following the literature on arbitrage-free pricing of bonds, we write down term 
structure relations for the Libor (or fed funds) term structure interest rates.  Let 
) (n
t P  
denote the price of a zero-coupon loan with n periods until maturity.  Equation 1 relates 
the yield on the loan, 
) (n
t i , to its price. The prices of zero-coupon loans follow the 
recursion given in equation 2, where  1 + t m denotes the pricing kernel.  As in Ang and 
Piazzesi (2003), we assume the pricing kernel takes the form shown in equation 3 and the 
market price of risk, t λ , takes the linear form shown in equation 4, where  t x  is a vector of 
variables that affect the price of risk.   9
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Similar equations can be written down for the OIS and the TAF rates.  In contrast to 
Libor loans, OIS transactions involve very little counterparty risk as no money changes 
hands until the maturity date.  The only potential loss in the case of default by the 
counterparty is the difference between the two interest rates on which the OIS is based.  
There does exist interest rate risk reflecting uncertainty regarding the future path of 
interest rates. However, given the relatively short maturities of loans that we study, the 
market price of interest rate risk is likely typically to be small.  In the following, we 
assume that the market price of risk associated with OIS transaction is constant. Loans 
from the TAF are collateralized and therefore also carry relatively small risk.  We 
therefore assume that the market price of risk associated with TAF loans is likewise 
constant.   
Taken together, this assumption of a constant market price of risk for OIS and 
TAF rates implies that as part of the null hypothesis of an absence of liquidity effects in 
the pricing of the various loans and abstracting from a constant differential risk premium, 
we have: 
) ( ) ( n
t
n
t s a = .  Moreover, absent liquidity effects, we would not expect the λi for 
the inter-bank rates to be influenced by the TAF.    10
Under these assumptions, the OIS rate equals the average of the overnight interest 
rates expected until maturity.  By subtracting the appropriate OIS rate from the term 
Libor yield, we are able to cleanse expectations effects from the Libor yield.  Under our 
null hypothesis of no liquidity effects, the resulting difference in rates, 
) ( ) ( n
t
n
t s i − , reflects 
only the pricing of risk associated with Libor lending relative to the constant price of risk 
associated with OIS transactions.  Thus, in the next section, we use this difference in 
yields as a measure of the effects of risk on yields.  We will use several different 




4. Focusing on the Libor OIS spread   
  Figure 2 plots the spread between Libor and OIS during the same period as in 
Figure 1. It paints quite a different picture of the spread, and shows the value of removing 
expectations of future interest rates in analyzing term spreads.  For example, looking at 
Figure 1 you might think the spread returned to normal by mid February. However, 
examination of Figure 2 shows that the spread is still quite large. In this chart and in the 
rest of our analysis we focus on 3-month Libor; similar results are found by looking at 
other maturities such as one-month Libor.   
  Figure 2 illustrates clearly how the spread between Libor and OIS jumped on 
August 9
th.  From December 4, 2001—the day when our OIS 3-month data begin—
through August 8, 2007, the spread averaged 11 basis points with a standard deviation of 
3.6 basis points.  It jumped by 25 basis points above this average to 34 basis points on 
                                                 
2 As described below, another measure of risk is the difference between rates on Libor and government 
repurchase agreements between banks.   11
August 9
th and fluctuated wildly between a minimum of 30 basis points and a maximum 
of 106 basis points, averaging 65 basis points through March 20. The peak was reached 
on December 6, 2007, and was followed by big downward movements on December 12-
14, 2007 and January 14-15, 2008. On March 20, it stood at 61 basis points, only slightly 
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  Figure 2.  Taking out the pure expectations effects 
 
Looking at spreads going back to December 2001 illustrates just how unusual this 
episode has been.  Figure 3 plots the same data as in Figure 2, but starting in December 
2001. As mentioned above, the spread on August 9 was 25 basis points above the pre-
August 9, 2007 average.  That is 7 times the standard deviation before August 9—more   12
than a 6-sigma event. The mean through March 20 was 16 standard deviations above the 
old mean, which under normality would have been an extraordinarily improbable event.  
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  Figure  3.    A Black Swan in the Money Market? 
 
  Another way to remove expectations effects is to look at the spread between 
unsecured inter-bank lending (Libor) and secured inter-bank government Repos 
(Repurchase Agreements backed by Treasury securities) of the same maturity, in this 
case, three months. By focusing on the difference between secured and unsecured 
lending, this spread may be a better way to extract pure risk.  However, we find much   13
more noise in this spread than in the Libor-OIS spread.  Traders we have consulted 
attribute this noise to technical factors such as tax considerations and collateral delivery 
glitches.  Figure 4 shows this measure of the risk spread. It is clearly noisier than the 
spread shown in Figures 2 and 3, making the recent financial turmoil appear less 
improbable than suggested by evidence based on Libor-OIS spreads.  Nonetheless, these 
past episodes were not nearly as large or persistent as those during the period starting in 
August 2007.  Because of this noise we will focus on the Libor-OIS spread as the main 
“dependent variable” in the remainder of this paper, using the Libor-Repo spread along 
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  Figure 4.  Another Way to Remove Expectations Effects 
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5. Overnight Funds Volatility: Counterparty Risk or Increased Tolerance to Misses   
  Thus far we have shown how important it is to take out expectations effects in 
order to assess the increase in risk and liquidity premia in the inter-bank market.  It is also 
possible to focus directly on the increase in volatility of the effective funds rate relative to 
its target as set by the FOMC. Figure 5 shows the difference between the effective fed 
funds rate and the target fed funds rate.  
  There are several possible explanations for the increased volatility or “misses” of 
the effective rate from the target. One is the same counterparty risk that is offered as an 
explanation for the spread seen in the term lending market.  Fed funds trades are largely 
bilateral. Hence, rates can differ from trade to trade, even at the same point in time. If 
traders are more circumspect about some borrowers than others, then this will show up in 
increased dispersion of the rates in these bilateral trades at each point in time.  Since the 
effective daily rate is estimated from these trades, its increased volatility could reflect the 
increased dispersion. If so, then the increase in volatility in the overnight market provides 
some corroborating evidence that counterparty risk may be part of the explanation for the 
increased spread in the term market. 
  Another explanation is that the underlying volatility in intraday trading in the fed 
funds market may have been driven by the New York Fed’s trading desk acting to 
prevent the rate from spiking above the target. Indeed, there is a noticeable downward 
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   Figure 5.  Increased Volatility in the Overnight Federal Funds Market 
 
6.  Measures and Indicators of Counterparty Risk 
  In this section, we consider a range of possible indicators of counterparty risk. To 
the extent that these are timed with the black swan event documented in Figure 2, they 
may offer evidence that such sources of risk, rather than more general liquidity concerns, 
were the main reason for the increased spread in the Libor markets.   
   
Asset Backed Commercial Paper versus Dealer Placed Commercial Paper 
  Another market that has been under extreme stress during this period is the 
market that grew as a mechanism for financing the purchase of home mortgages in the 
process of assembling them into various derivative securities.  Because the commercial   16
paper was backed by these mortgages or by the mortgage pools, they are called asset- 
backed commercial paper.  They are a potential measure of the counterparty risk in 
commercial banks because banks held this paper either directly or indirectly through their 
Structured Investment Vehicle operations. 
  Figure 6 shows the spread between asset-backed commercial paper and dealer-
placed commercial paper, which excludes the more risky asset-backed issues, letter-of-
credit issues, and direct issues from firms. Clearly, there was an increase in the spread 
about the same time as the Libor spreads increased and the patterns of decline and the ups 
and downs also have similarities. To the extent that this is a good indicator of 
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  Figure 6.  Asset Backed Commercial Paper Spreads Increased  
   about the Same Time as Libor Spreads   17
 
 
 Credit Default Swaps 
Another measure of counterparty risk is the probability that banks might default 
on their debt.  These probabilities can be assessed using the premiums on credit default 
swaps (CDS) that are like insurance policies for corporate bonds. The buyer of a credit 
default swap pays a periodic fee to a seller in exchange for the promise of a payment, in 
the event of bankruptcy or default, of the difference between the par value and the market 
value of the corporate bond. Figure 7 shows the rapidly rising rates on five-year CDS for 
several major financial institutions through March 20, 2008 including Bear Stearns.  Note 
the increase starting in July of 2007.  Figure 8 focuses on four large commercial banks. 
Unlike the asset backed commercial paper spread, there is no evidence of a decline in risk 
at the time that the Libor spreads declined. 
































Figure 8. Risks at four major banks also rose though not so sharply. 
 
Developments in other Countries 
  The turmoil affecting money markets was not limited to the United States.   
Spreads between term and overnight inter-bank lending have risen in Canada, Europe, 
and Japan, at the same time as in the United States.  The similarities and differences 
across countries help illuminate the possible sources of the rise in these spreads.   
  Euro Libor and Pound Sterling Libor   Figure 9 shows the Libor spreads for 
loans in Euros and Pound Sterling using the same OIS adjustment method we used to 
calculate the U.S. dollar Libor spreads in Figure 2. We plot these other two spreads along 
with the dollar spread since 2004. All three spreads move closely together, indicating that   20
whatever the source of these spreads, it is affecting money markets for all three 
currencies in the same way.  This close correspondence in spreads is not as surprising as 
it first may appear. In fact, there is considerable overlap in the lists of banks that are 
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Figure 9. Libor spread increased in three major currencies in August 2007 
 
  Yen Libor and Tibor.  Another useful indicator is a comparison of the Libor rate 
denominated in Yen to that of the Tibor, the rate on inter-bank loans between Japanese 
banks in the Tokyo markets. In the appendix, we report the banks in the two surveys. 
Figure 10 shows these two rates since the mid 1990s.  Note that the chart shows the Libor 
yields themselves, not spreads.  Japanese interest rates have been much lower than   21
interest rates in the United States, Europe or the UK. Nonetheless, spreads can and do 
develop between different types of inter-bank lending and indicate risk factors in the 
banking sector.  Indeed, in the late 1990s, Japanese banks experienced sizable spreads on 
inter-bank lending comparable to what is being experienced in New York and London in 
this recent episode of stress. As explained by Peek and Rosengren (2001) and Corvig, 
Low, and Melvin (2004), risks in the banking sector in Tokyo caused interest rates on 
inter-bank loans to rise in Tokyo compared with London. In other words, Tibor rates rose 
relative to Libor rates, as shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, which shows the Tibor-Libor 
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Figure 10. Pattern of Tibor and Libor since 1990s   22
 
This pattern of Tibor-Libor spreads has reversed, with Tibor rates now lower than 
corresponding Libor rates. One interpretation is that the demand for liquidity has not 
risen as much for Japanese banks as for the major banks in these other markets.  In our 
view, a more probable explanation is that the risks associated with inter-bank loans from 
American and European banks have increased relative to those for loans among Japanese 
banks.  Accordingly, the “negative Japan premium” or Japan discount provides another 
















Figure 11.  Unlike the Japan premium in the 1990s the Tibor-Libor spread turned 
negative fell when Libor spreads increased in the United States and Europe 
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  Swiss Libor.  Finally we look at Libor loans denominated in Swiss Francs.  The 
Swiss National Bank (SNB) follows a different strategy for monetary operations than the 
Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, or the Bank of England.  The Swiss 
National Bank targets the three-month Libor rate and adjusts the amount of liquidity in 
the overnight market to hit its target. (For a theoretical analysis of such a policy 
framework, see McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams, 2005).  Hence, if there is an 
increase in the spread between three-month Libor and the overnight rate, then the SNB 
will take actions to reduce the overnight rate by providing extra liquidity to the market. 
(Jordan and Kugler,, 2004.)  As a result, a very different pattern emerges in the overnight 
and term Libor rates.  However, the same evidence of risk emerges if one looks at the 
spread between overnight and term rates. 
  These actions can be seen clearly in Figure 12. With a target for 3-month Libor of 
2.75 percent, the overnight rate declined, rose, and declined again while the Libor rate 
remained relatively steady. Hence, the spread between Libor and overnight rates was 
realized by moving the overnight rate around.  The way this works is nicely illustrated in 














Figure 12. Term Libor spread in Switzerland resulted in a temporary decline  
in the overnight rate with current operating procedures at the SNB 
 
 
7.  The Term Auction Facility 
  In an effort to lower the unusual term lending spreads documented in Figure 2, the 
Federal Reserve took a number of actions. First it lowered the spread between the 
discount rate and the fed funds target directly and encouraged more discount window 
borrowing.  But, banks did not increase their borrowing to any large degree.  Second, in 
December 2007, the Federal Reserve established a new facility called the term auction 
facility (TAF) to provide liquidity directly to financial institutions at a longer duration, 
and thereby drive down the spread on term lending relative to overnight loans.  
According to the Federal Reserve Board, by injecting “term funds through a broader 
range of counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open market 
operations, this facility could help ensure that liquidity provisions can be disseminated   25
efficiently even when the unsecured interbank markets are under stress” (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve, 2007).  
  The TAF was first announced on Dec 12, 2007.  The TAF allows financial 
institutions to make bids for term borrowing from the Fed, with maturities typically of 28 
days.  Beginning in late December of 2007, two TAF auctions have been held each 
month. Table 1 provides key information about each of the auctions that occurred during 
the period of our study. TAF loans are collateralized following the procedures used for 
discount window borrowing. The Board of Governors sets the auction amount and the 
minimum bid allowed for the interest rate, which is set equal to the OIS rate 
corresponding to the term of the loan. The interest rate on the loans is determined in a 
single-price auction and is reported as the “TAF” rate in Table 1.  The spread between the 
TAF rates and the OIS rate at the time bids were taken averaged around 50 basis points 
for the first two auctions, but then fell in subsequent auctions, before rising again to 
around 40 basis points in the first auction of March, 2008.  
 
Table 1  
Term Auctions Facility (TAF) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                   Term  Amt   Min.  TAF       1-Month   Bid/Cover   
Day of Bid      Settlement     (days)  ($B)  Rate  Rate       Libor  Ratio 
____________________________________________________________________ 
       
12/17/07  12/20/07     28   20  4.17  4.650      4.965  3.08   
12/20/07  12/27/07     35   20  4.15  4.670      4.896  2.88    
01/14/08  01/17/08      28   30  3.88  3.950      4.081  1.85      
01/28/08  01/31/08      28   30  3.10  3.123      3.281  1.25     
02/11/08  01/24/08      28   30  2.86  3.010      3.139  1.95 
02/25/08  02/28/08  28   30  2.81     3.080     3.124  2.27   
03/10/08  03/13/08  28   50  2.39  2.800     2.935  1.85        
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: the 1-month labor rate refers to the rates on the day the TAF bids were submitted. 
   26
 
Early reports on the effectiveness of the TAF were generally favorable.  The 
auctions were oversubscribed and the TAF rates were below the one-month Libor rate 
prevailing at the time that bids were submitted, as seen in Table 1.  Moreover, as noted 
above, Libor-OIS spreads fell sharply between late December and mid January.  Figure 
13 shows the dates of the TAF auctions with vertical lines along with the Libor-OIS 
spreads at one- and three-month maturities.  After the first two auctions, the TAF rate has 
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  Figure  13.    Timing of the TAF auctions and Libor – OIS spreads 
  
  At the same time the TAF was introduced, other central banks, including the Bank  
of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Swiss National   27
Bank, also took measures to increase term lending.  The ECB and SNB launched their 
own term auction facilities starting in December of 2007.  These auctions are summarized 
in the Appendix. The ECB and SNB participated in TAF auctions in December and 
January that occurred on days in which the Fed held TAF auctions. No further ECB or 
SNB TAF auctions took place during our sample (they have since restarted after the end 
of our sample).  In addition, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England increased their 
term repo lending in December and January; those programs were then curtailed (they, 
too, have since restarted). 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Domestic Open Market Operations in 2007, February 2008 
 
Figure 14 TAF did not increase the total amount of liquidity 
 
















Figure 15.   As TAF borrowings from the Fed go up, non-borrowed reserves decline to 
offset the increase, keeping total reserves unchanged 
 
 
In assessing the effects of the TAF, it is important to note that it does not increase 
the amount of total liquidity in the money markets. Any increase in liquidity that comes 
from banks borrowing from the Fed using the TAF will be offset by open market sales of 
securities by the Fed to keep the total supply of reserves from falling rapidly. The actions 
are essentially automatic in the sense that the Fed must sell securities to keep the federal 
funds rate on target. Figure 14 shows that this is indeed what has happened under the 
TAF. The System Open Market Account reduced its outright holdings of securities (light 
blue area) by essentially the same amount as the TAF (dark blue area). This can also be 
seen in Figure 15: Note that TAF borrowings have increased dramatically only to be 
completely offset by a sharp decline in non-borrowed reserves leaving total bank reserves 
at the Fed largely unchanged.      29
 
8. Econometric Tests 
 
  In this section, we endeavor to test how various factors—including the risk 
measures explored in previous sections, and liquidity measures like the TAF—affect the 
Libor-OIS spread. Simply put, the term structure model described in this paper implies 
that risk factors should affect the spread and the TAF should not, and this is what we 
would like to test.  To be sure, by focusing on the impact of the TAF on the spread we do 
not mean to imply that the Federal Reserve did not have other goals in creating the TAF, 
including reducing the stigma associated with discount window borrowing by banks.  
Nevertheless, reducing the spread was one of the purposes of the TAF and one of the 
ways suggested to measure its success.  For example, as stated by Mishkin (2008), 
“Isolating the impact of the TAF on financial markets is not easy, particularly given other 
recent market developments and the evolution of expectations regarding the federal funds 
rate.  Nonetheless, the interest rates in term markets provide some evidence that the TAF 
may have had significant beneficial effects on financial markets….term funding rates 
have dropped substantially relative to OIS rates:  The one-month spread exceeded 100 
basis points in early December but has dropped below 30 basis points in recent weeks--
though still above the low level that prevailed before the onset of the financial disruption 
last August.”  See also Board of Governors (2008) for similar comments regarding the 
purpose and early evaluation of the effects of the TAF.  
  Our tests are performed with simple regressions, summarized in Tables 2 and 3.  
In each regression we use daily data, as presented in the charts above, during the sample 
period from January 2, 2007 through March 20, 2008, a span of time that includes both   30
the market turmoil period and a comparable period of time before the turmoil.  The 
dependent variable in each case is either the three-month Libor–OIS spread, shown in 
Table 2, or the one-month Libor-OIS spread, shown in Table 3. The independent 
variables are various indicators of counterparty risk, including the asset backed 
commercial paper spread (CP spread), credit default swaps for major banks (CDS-CITI 
and CDS-BOA), the Tibor-Libor spread (for the 3 month maturity regression only), and 
the Libor-Repo spread. These variables are listed in left hand columns. Each regression 
also includes a TAF dummy (TAF) which is one on each of the TAF bid submission 
dates and zero elsewhere.   There are five sets of regressions corresponding to the 
different risk measures.  For each of the risk measures, we report OLS regressions as well 
as regressions corrected for first-order serial correlation (AR(1)), with the estimated serial 
correlation coefficient ρ reported. 
   31
Table 2 




  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Constant  0.1430 0.3650 0.1650 0.2296 0.1081 0.2107 0.1012 0.5642 -0.0206 0.2709 
  (0.2467) (0.1898) (0.0388) (0.1933) (0.0394) (0.2029) (0.0302) (0.3729) (0.0197) (0.1428) 
CP  Spread 0.7885  0.0450          
  (0.0925)  (0.0584)          
CDS-CITI     0.0043  0.0034        
     (0.0008)  (0.0010)        
CDS-BOA       0.0069  0.0055      
       (0.0010)  (0.0016)      
Tibor-Libor  Spread         -4.4926  -0.6549    
         (0.4270)  (0.3199)    
Libor-Repo  Spread           0.6715  0.1340 
           (0.0405)  (0.0726) 
TAF  0.0645 0.0208 0.0797 0.0041 0.0875 0.0050 0.1595 0.0250 -0.0198 0.0162 
  (0.0545) (0.0150) (0.1449) (0.0076) (0.1513) (0.0086) (0.0493) (0.0123) (0.0269) (0.0119) 
AR(1)   0.9833  0.9806  0.9808  0.9864  0.9788 
   (0.0111)  (0.0147)  (0.0143)  (0.0119)  (0.0123) 
R
2  0.707 0.980 0.438 0.983 0.473 0.984 0.623 0.976 0.877 0.981 
 
Note: Newey-West standard errors are reported under coefficient estimates.   32
Table 3 




  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant  -0.0002 -0.6458 0.1327 0.1726 0.0942 0.1336 -0.0163 0.1650 
  (0.2553) (0.3031) (0.0308) (0.1823) (0.0303) (0.1924) (0.0246) (0.0895) 
CP  Spread  0.0524  0.1919        
  (0.0528)  (0.0516)        
CDS-CITI     0.0029  0.0023        
     (0.0006)  (0.0011)        
CDS-BOA       0.0047  0.0045    
       (0.0008)  (0.0012)    
Libor-Repo  Spread         0.5779  0.1637 
         (0.0651)  (0.1011) 
TAF  0.2369 0.0317 0.1218 0.0051 0.1243 0.0056 -0.0082 0.0186 
  (0.0967) (0.0134) (0.1746) (0.0104) (0.1815) (0.0115) (0.0407) (0.0138) 
AR(1)   0.9821  0.9706  0.9743  0.9656 
   (0.0131)  (0.0213)  (0.0201)  (0.0184) 
R
2  0.034 0.964 0.269 0.961 0.288 0.964 0.797 0.966 
 
Note: Newey-West standard errors are reported  33
 
  In all cases, the risk measures enter with the correct sign and are usually highly 
significant in both the one-month and the three-month maturity regressions.  In contrast, 
the TAF dummy variable is always insignificant or of the wrong sign. The common 
theme of these results is that (1) one can easily reject the null hypothesis that the 
counterparty risk factors are not significant in the Libor OIS spread and (2) one cannot 




  In this paper we documented the unusually large spread between term Libor and 
overnight interest rates in the United States and other money markets beginning on 
August 9, 2007. We also introduced a financial model to adjust for expectations effects 
and to test for various explanations that have been offered to explain this unusual 
development.  
  The model has two implications. First is that counterparty risk is a key factor in 
explaining the spread between the Libor rate and the OIS rate, and second is that the TAF 
should not have an effect on the spread. Since the TAF does not affect total liquidity, 
expectations of future overnight rates, or counterparty risk, the model implies that it will 
not affect the spread. Our simple econometric tests support both of those implications of 
our model.   34
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 provide lists of banks participating in the various Libor 
surveys and the Tibor survey in 2007.  The U.S., Euro, and UK lists all include the same 
14 banks (out of 16 banks in each survey). The Libor is computed taking the average of 
rates in the survey, after dropping the 25 percent highest and 25% lowest rates.  The 
Tibor is computed by averaging the rates in the survey, after dropping the two highest 
and two lowest rates. 
Appendix Table 3 summarizes the results from the TAF auctions held by the 
European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank during our sample period.  Note that 
the European Central Bank TAF auction was structured so that the TAF rate was identical 
to that from the corresponding TAF auction held by the Federal Reserve. 
 
 
Appendix Table 1.  Banks in Libor Survey (2007) 
 
United States  Euro  UK  Switzerland 
 
Bank of America  
 
Bank of America  
 
Bank of America  
 
Bank of Tokyo – 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Bank of Tokyo – 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Bank of Tokyo – 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Bank of Tokyo – 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Barclays Bank  Barclays Bank  Barclays Bank   Barclays Bank 
Citibank NA   Citibank NA   Citibank NA   Citibank NA  
Deutsche Bank   Deutsche Bank  Deutsche Bank  Deutsche Bank  
HSBC   HSBC   HSBC   HSBC  
JP Morgan Chase   JP Morgan Chase   JP Morgan Chase   JP Morgan Chase 
Lloyds TSB Bank   Lloyds TSB Bank   Lloyds TSB Bank   Lloyds TSB Bank 
Rabobank   Rabobank   Rabobank    
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group  
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group  
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group  
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group  
UBS AG   UBS AG   UBS AG   UBS AG  
West LB AG  West LB AG  West LB AG  West LB AG 
HBOS   HBOS   HBOS    
Royal Bank of 
Canada  
Royal Bank of 
Canada  
Royal Bank of 
Canada  
 
Credit Suisse   Credit Suisse   Abbey National  Credit Suisse 
Norinchukin Bank  Société Générale   BNP Paribas  Société Générale   36
Appendix Table 2.  Banks in Japan’s Libor and Tibor Surveys (2007) 
 
Libor Tibor 
Bank of Tokyo –Mitsubishi UFJ  Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi UFJ 
Mizuho Corporate Bank  Mizuho Corporate Bank 
Norinchukin Bank  Norinchukin Bank 
SMBCE SMBCE 
Bank of America   Mizuho Bank, Ltd.,  
Barclays Bank  Resona Bank 
Citibank NA   Saitama Resona Bank 
Deutsche Bank  The Bank of Yokohama,  
HSBC   Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking 
Corporation 
JP Morgan Chase   Mizuho Trust and Banking Co  
Lloyds TSB Bank   The Chuo Mitsui Trust and Banking Co.  
Rabobank  The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group   Shinsei Bank 
UBS AG   Aozora Bank 
West LB AG  DEPFA Bank 
Société Générale  Shinkin Central Bank 
 
 
Appendix Table 3. ECB and SNB Term Auctions Facilities (TAF) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                   Term  Amt   Min.  TAF       1-Month   Bid/Cover   
Day of Bid      Settlement     (days)  ($B)  Rate  Rate       Libor  Ratio 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Swiss  National  Bank        
12/17/07  12/20/07     28     4  4.17  4.170      4.965  4.25   
01/14/08  01/17/08      28     4  3.88  3.88        4.081  2.72   
European Central Bank     
12/17/07  12/20/07     28   10  4.17  4.650      4.965  2.21   
12/21/07  12/27/07     35   10  4.15  4.670      4.896  1.41   
01/14/08  01/17/08      28   10  3.88  3.950      4.081  1.48   
01/28/08  01/31/08      28   10  3.10  3.123      3.281  1.24   
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: 1-month labor rate refers to rates on the day bids were submitted in the Federal 
Reserve TAF. 